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Introduction 
Over the past decade, the business world has devoted an extraordinary amount of 
attention to the concept of “corporate social responsibility.”   “CSR” derives from the 
idea that the responsibility of a corporation extends beyond the traditional Anglo-
American objective of providing maximal financial returns to its shareholders.  Instead, 
CSR proponents have argued, the legitimate concerns of a corporation should include 
such broader objectives as sustainable growth, equitable employment practices, and long-
term social and environmental well-being.  Corporate managers, they contend, should 
consider not only their shareholders in making their decisions but also a variety of 
“stakeholder” constituencies, including employees, residents of communities affected by 
corporate activities, governments, and organizations advocating for various social and 
environmental interests. 
CSR is now the focus of a well-defined and energetic movement that has 
manifested itself in a variety of ways.  It is, in Sally Engle Merry’s (2006a:28-29) 
phrasing, a global reform movement that represents a “corner” of globalization itself.  On 
the legal front, it has thus far had limited impact in the United States; American corporate 
2law is still largely focused on shareholder value.  In Europe and the United Kingdom, 
however, the CSR movement has been a major factor in moving the theory and practice 
of corporate law in the stakeholder direction.  Beyond these legal developments, the 
influence of the CSR movement can also be seen in the voluntary behavior of 
corporations.    Many of the world’s largest companies have started to produce social and 
environmental reports in addition to their required financial reports.  Many of the same 
companies have also altered the way they interact with their stakeholders, especially the 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)–environmental, labor, human rights, and other 
issue-advocacy organizations—that are often their most strident critics.  NGOs now help 
corporations to identify issues, produce and audit reports, conduct “dialogs” with diverse 
stakeholders throughout the world, and address specific problems. Instead of adversarial 
standoffs, one now often sees “engagement” and “partnerships.” 
A critical question is whether these developments will prove to be nothing more 
than trends in corporate communication, what the sociologist Ronen Shamir (2004a:675) 
has called “an impression management strategy designed to improve [corporations’] 
image and enhance their market competitiveness.”  We have heard corporate CSR people 
ask, “What should we be doing to demonstrate we’re a socially responsible company?” 
Others have spoken of the need “to avoid sending different messages to different parts of 
the world” and, perhaps most tellingly, have characterized themselves as “stewards of our 
reputation.”  Against this background, do CSR activities reflect, or at least portend, an 
important shift in corporate managers’ perceptions of their social responsibilities, or are 
they simply efforts at public relations, reputation building, and the preemption of onerous 
legal requirements?   
3The many participants in these activities comprise the contemporary CSR 
community.  They include a new class of CSR professionals within for-profit companies; 
yet another new class of outsiders who consult with companies and audit their 
nonfinancial reports; the lawyers who advise corporations on whether they may or must 
attend to stakeholder interests; “socially responsible investors” who purport to put their 
money where their social consciences are; those who work for and on behalf of NGOs; 
government officials worldwide whose mandate covers social and environmental issues; 
and their counterparts at transnational agencies such as the World Bank Group.   
Shamir (2004a:669) has characterized CSR as a “field of action” shaped by the 
interplay between popular pressure on corporations and the latter’s response to that 
pressure.  The field is the site of a contest between “those players who associate the term 
‘responsibility’ with an ever-increasing set of moral duties” and “corporations and a host 
of other players who tend to associate the concept of CSR with a voluntary and altruistic 
spirit and insist, at best, on self-regulatory schemes” (ibid.671).  In this paper we report 
on an ongoing project in which we endeavor to treat the CSR movement as a 
“deterritorialized” ethnographic site (Merry 2006a:28). We are investigating the meaning 
of  CSR to people in corporations and their various stakeholders, examining the ways in 
which CSR is practiced, and assessing the potential impact, within a company and 
beyond, of a firm’s undertaking CSR initiatives.  It is difficult to observe people “doing” 
CSR in a physical sense; there is no ready equivalent to a kula voyage.  Nonetheless, 
through participant observation of public CSR events, interviews with many kinds of 
CSR protagonists, and discourse analysis of CSR texts, we are developing a picture of the 
complex culture of CSR.  By “culture,” we mean, following Merry (2006a:15), the shared 
4(if contested) beliefs, values, ways of knowing, practices, habits, language, and other 
resources that are available to participants as they strive to define CSR, advance or resist 
particular visions of CSR, and compete for the various sources of power that CSR 
engenders. 
CSR as an Anthropological Problem 
Theoretically, our work builds on a growing body of research in 
anthropology and sociology concerning various aspects of globalization and the global 
economy.  At the highest level of abstraction, our work is rooted in economic 
anthropology.  In reaction to the political and legal hegemony of neoclassical economics, 
contemporary anthropology characterizes Western economic thought as a case of “ethno-
economics”: a cultural practice, a modeling of material life (Bird-David 1997).  If so, 
then CSR can usefully be studied as an aspect of that practice, as discourse and behavior 
that promise to mitigate some of neoclassicism’s harsher effects while reaffirming its 
core values.    
More specifically, the anthropology of development has posed a number 
of number of fundamental questions about neoclassicism’s interaction with other cultural 
systems, several of which are directly relevant to CSR.  Arturo Escobar (1997:503) asks, 
“In what ways was the ‘Third World’ constituted as a reality for modern expert 
knowledge?”  CSR is a case study in the operation of modern expert knowledge upon the 
economic and cultural Other.  Escobar (ibid.) also asks whether the entire concept of 
“development,” including the currently ascendant “sustainable development,” is an 
“invention, that is, a historically singular experience that was nether natural nor 
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inevitable, but very much the product of identifiable historical processes.”  Sustainable 
development is a taken-for-granted but poorly-defined value that lies at the core of CSR, 
raising the related questions of what it means to CSR enthusiasts and how it became so 
naturalized.  Finally, Escobar (ibid.) questions development’s “map,” “a view of the 
apparatus of expert knowledge” that organizes “the simultaneous production of 
knowledge and power.”  As will be seen, CSR experts not only acknowledge, but take 
pride in “mapping” their diverse stakeholders, all but demanding an analysis of this 
particular instance of knowledge and power begetting each other. 
 Although there is little work in anthropology dealing directly with CSR, 
research on a number of related corporate issues is relevant.  In his already-classic Seeing 
Like a State, James Scott (1998) was among the first to observe that the multinational 
corporation was succeeding to many of the functions and powers that had previously 
been monopolized by nation-states.  Following Scott in his own work on oil company 
enclaves in Africa, James Ferguson (2005:377) concludes that “global capitalism just 
does what the modernizing development state once did—only to a larger degree.”  
“According to the mythology of neoliberal globalization,” Ferguson (ibid.:379) contends, 
the result of these activities was supposed to have been a “structural adjustment” that 
would liberate “a newly vital ‘civil society’” and ultimately bring about “a new sort of 
‘governance’ that would be both more democratic and more efficient.”  Instead, Ferguson 
finds, the result has been an “outsourcing” of governmental functions to NGOs that has 
“decapitated” African governments. 
 This “new governance” has also been a major theme in recent scholarship 
in law and political science (Scott 2003; Slaughter 2003).  According to new governance 
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theory, the democratic state is in the midst of a shift to a “post-regulatory” model 
characterized by a weakening of top-down governmental regulation of in favor of a 
diffusion of rights and responsibilities among governments, private companies, NGOs, 
and other interested parties.  The essence of the post-regulatory state, captured in the 
linguistic shift from government to governance, is the diffusion of regulatory power 
among networks of state and non-state actors that transcend national boundaries.  This is 
precisely what the CSR movement seems to be demanding and, up to a point, to be 
producing.  But critics of the new governance question the processes—or lack thereof—
for selecting those who will share this diffused power, and ask how these people and 
institutions will be held accountable (e.g., Bendell 2005).  These turn out to be questions 
that CSR protagonists are asking of themselves, with no consensus about the answers.  In 
many respects, then, understanding the realities of CSR provides a unique opportunity to 
test new governance theory against practice.  
 Anthropologists have done extensive work on the non- and inter-
governmental organizations and networks that are central actors in the practice of the new 
governance (see generally Cowan 2006).  Often, as in Annelise Riles’s work on 
international human rights lawyers, these organizations  are treated as elites or “expert 
cultures,” defined—and empowered--by distinctive “knowledge practices” (Riles 
2006:53).  Most relevant to our project has been Merry’s (2006a, 2006b) work on the 
international women’s rights movement. 
 Methodologically, Merry has applied the concept of multi-sited or 
derritorialized ethnography to a global reform movement, an approach we have emulated 
on a more modest scale.  Also, as previously noted, we have followed a similar 
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understanding of culture, striving in particular to see CSR as a “global cultural process” 
involving “transnational culture flows and their relationships to local cultural spaces” 
(Merry 2006a:19).  We believe that the latter concept will be especially salient as we 
focus on the Equator Principles, which, as explained in the next section, involve the 
promulgation of transnational human rights and environmental standards and their 
application in diverse local cultural settings (Szablowski 2007).  Finally, we have been 
sensitized by Merry’s writing on the problem of voice in elite transnational reform 
movements, as when she asks, “Who speaks for culture?” (ibid.:16). 
 There is also a substantial and rapidly growing anthropological literature 
on corporations and their activities.  Chris Ballard and Glenn Banks (2003), for example, 
have written of “the anthropology of mining,” using the technique of multi-sited 
ethnography to explore such issues as “the internal structure and politics of mining 
corporations” (ibid.:290), “mining discourses” (ibid.:292), and the concept of resources 
as a “curse” on the development of a functional state.  In an edited volume, Carl Maida 
(2007) and his contributors have looked critically at the usually taken-for-granted concept 
of sustainability, examining its meaning in various “communities of place.”  And many 
anthropologists have investigated specific corporations as ethnographic sites, their 
approaches ranging from the highly theoretical (Llewellyn and Harrison 2006; Moore 
2005; Nafus and Anderson 2006) to the applied (Jordan 2003). 
 With respect to the study of CSR itself, the work that most directly 
parallels this project comes from sociology and law.   As noted earlier, the sociologist 
Shamir has identified CSR as a “field of action,” which is clearly analogous to an 
anthropologist’s “site.”  He, too, has analyzed CSR as an exercise in the new governance, 
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a “conceptual space where various regulatory/disciplinary regimes are pursued and 
negotiated among a host of players” (Shamir 2004b:659), and has reported on an 
essentially ethnographic study (Shamir 2005) of CSR activity in Israel that focuses on 
framing and the construction of meaning. We have been pursuing many of the same 
themes from a perspective that is explicitly cultural, with a particular emphasis on 
language.  Finally, David Szablowski (2007), a law and society scholar, has done what he 
terms a “case study” of a Peruvian mining project that has a strong ethnographic 
component, and that emphasizes the complex interactions between transnational norms 
and local realities.   
Background and Methods of the Project 
 For both practical and theoretical reasons, our primary focus has been on 
discourse: practically, because so much of the “action” of CSR consists of talk; and 
theoretically, because of the well-recognized “role of language and meaning in the 
constitution of social reality” (Escobar 1997:501).  We have therefore devoted most of 
our attention to what participants say at CSR community events, what they say in 
interviews, and what they write in CSR communications.  As of this writing, more than 
four years into the project, we have attended eight major CSR conferences in the United 
States and Europe. We have watched, listened, occasionally asked questions in public 
sessions, and conducted follow-up interviews as CSR participants from the various 
affected sectors gather to debate issues, inform each other, and develop practical plans for 
action.  We have also participated in a month-long online, interactive conference, and  
have been involved in three “multi-stakeholder dialogs.” We have thus far conducted 
more than sixty interviews (in the United States, Canada, and Europe) of corporate CSR 
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specialists and other executives interested in CSR, consultants of various sorts, lawyers, 
institutional investors, investment advisors and money managers, government officials, 
journalists who cover CSR, and representatives from a range of NGOs.  We continue to 
add to the interview corpus, with an evolving focus that is described below. 
 The interviews have varied widely in content, depending on the 
background, work, and interests of the subjects.  Our approach has been the one that 
Conley has used in a series of prior projects involving law and business (e.g., Conley and 
O’Barr 1990; O’Barr and Conley 1992). Working from a general and flexible topic 
outline, we prompt our interlocutors to set the specific agenda, moving from topic to 
topic as they see fit, giving various topics such emphasis as they may choose, and 
commenting freely on outlook and practices.  Again following Conley’s previous work, 
in analyzing the interviews and our participant observations of CSR events, we have paid 
particular attention to the details of discourse, examining closely the ways in which 
people choose to express themselves.  In so doing, we are motivated by the related 
concerns of linguistic anthropology and conversation analysis:  in the former case, an 
interest in “language as a cultural resource and speaking as a cultural practice” (Duranti 
1997:2); and in the latter, the belief that “talk can be examined as an object in its own 
right” (Schegloff 1992:xviii),  because “structure and meaning are ‘emergent’, created in 
the process of interaction as people devise strategies for responding to the immediate 
situation and solving the immediate communicative problems” (Johnstone 2002:108). 
 For the same reasons, we have also undertaken the qualitative discourse 
analysis of several CSR reports issued by multinational corporations.  In this paper we 
discuss four such reports, two each issued by ExxonMobil and British American 
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Tobacco.  Additional analyses are in progress; for the reasons discussed in the next 
paragraph, we are looking now at multinational banks. 
 For the first three-plus years of the project, we focused on CSR generally.  
We have published a series of papers, largely for legal audiences, that provide an 
overview of our observations and analyses (Conley and Williams 2005) and address such 
specific questions as the nature and purpose of the corporation (ibid.; Williams and 
Conley 2005a), the comparative law of CSR (Williams and Conley 2007), the role of 
corporations in securing and promoting human rights (Williams and Conley 2005b), and 
the realities of modifying corporate behavior (Conley 2005).  For much of the past year 
we have turned our attention to a specific instance of CSR:  the Equator Principles (EPs).   
The EPs are set of “best practices” adopted by most of the developed world’s 
multinational banks for assessing and mitigating the social and environmental risks of 
major infrastructure projects that they finance—dams, refineries, port facilities, etc. 
(Szablowski 2007).  We are early in the process of interviewing (approximately two 
dozen to date) representatives of the banks that make such loans, the corporations that 
seek them, the large law firms that arrange them, and the governments and NGOs that 
monitor them.  We have also been participant observers at a major EP conference in 
London attended by bankers, consultants, government officials, and lawyers.   With 
support from a recent grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, a 
Canadian government research organization, we hope soon to be able to expand our 
research to include ethnographic visits to EP banks and to the sites of some of the 
projects funded by EP loans—in Merry’s terms, to move from the transnational to the 
local. 
 11
The Look and Feel of the CSR Movement 
 A “CSR community” has clearly emerged both in the United States and 
Europe, with a distinct and evolving repertoire of rituals and language.  This reality was 
vividly illustrated at the outset of the project.  In Los Angeles in November 2003, we 
attended the annual meeting of Business for Social Responsibility, an umbrella 
organization in the United States that brings together companies ranging from the Fortune 
50 to local boutiques, CSR consultants, advocacy groups of many stripes, religious 
organizations, socially responsible investment advisors, journalists, and an eclectic mix 
of interested individuals.  The group, which numbered approximately 1,000,  seemed 
remarkably homogeneous.  At the simplest level, the group looked homogeneous, with 
virtually everyone affecting a mellow-casual look (a grade less formal than corporate 
casual).  The discourse was uniformly affirming, congratulatory, and therapeutic; 
process, journey, dialog (as noun or verb), facilitating, verified (on one occasion 
combined into “facilitated and verified dialogue”), embedding, and message were 
recurrent terms and dominant themes.  Regardless of whether the speaker was the “Vice-
President for People and Culture” at a fashion boutique or a tobacco company scientist, 
we did not hear a single question that was even challenging, let alone hostile.  From all 
available evidence, this was a gathering of believers, a movement in progress.  The talk 
focused on “us,” presumably in reference to the CSR movement. 
Despite its egalitarian tone, the movement clearly has its stars.  At the BSR 
gathering, the CSR team from British American Tobacco was at the top of the A-list, at 
least as judged by audience size and reaction.  Their breakout session on “Stakeholder 
Engagement: Learning from Experience” was the subject of intense anticipation.  The 
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presentation, delivered by a strikingly diverse four-member panel brought from BAT’s 
locations around the world, to the accompaniment of sophisticated PowerPoint slides, 
played to a packed room.  The question period featured universal praise for BAT’s 
engagement of stakeholders ranging from European health authorities to South African 
office workers to Central American farmers.   When the formal session concluded the 
audience crowded onto the stage to continue the discussion.  To us neophyte observers, 
that a tobacco company could play such a role had a surreal quality.   
A different sense of the CSR movement emerged in February 2005, when we 
observed a conference in London entitled “Business/NGO Partnerships and Engagement:  
How To Make Sure Everyone Gets What They Want.”  It was considerably smaller than 
the BSR gathering, with about 200 attendees.  Perhaps because of the British venue, it 
was also considerably more formal, with business suits the order of the day.  Other 
aspects of the gathering exhibited both similarities and differences with the earlier 
American meeting. 
The language was similar in many respects.  Indeed, the two key words in the 
conference title, partnerships and engagement, had figured prominently in the discourse 
in Los Angeles.  Process and dialog were also recurrent words and themes.  By contrast, 
however, the language of affirmation and congratulations that was so prominent in Los 
Angeles was largely absent in London.  This difference was perhaps attributable to the 
narrower purpose of the London meeting.  Whereas the Los Angeles conference had been 
a big-tent gathering of CSR enthusiasts, the London conference was focused on the nuts-
and-bolts activity of organizing and managing partnerships in which an NGO advises and 
monitors a corporation in the area of the NGO’s expertise. 
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This difference in purpose may also have accounted for a marked difference in 
tone between the two conferences (although we cannot discount the mere passage of 
time—perhaps the bloom had come off the communal rose in fifteen months.)  Every 
discussion we heard in Los Angeles was positive, but there was considerable tension in 
the air at the London sessions.  Even when successful partners appeared on stage together 
to discuss and analyze their arrangements, each side took considerable care to preserve its 
separate identity.  One especially striking pairing involved the executive director of 
Greenpeace UK and the CEO of the British power company npower.  Although the 
particular “engagement” involved the monitoring of an offshore windmill project, the 
Greenpeace representative anticipated skepticism about his organization’s involvement 
with a company that also generates nuclear power.  He repeatedly stressed that 
Greenpeace remains a “campaigning NGO,” always ready to take “direct action” in 
support of its “fairly radical policy positions.”  Speaking preemptively, he acknowledged 
“the risk of selling out.”  Aggressive questions from the floor indicated that others shared 
his concern. 
Another session entitled “When Agreements Do Not Work Out” produced a level 
of hostility unseen at the Los Angeles gathering.  The featured speaker was a former CSR 
executive from Asia Pulp and Paper (“APP”), an Indonesian company that has been 
targeted by environmentalists for its alleged destruction of rainforests.  He analyzed the 
company’s failed environmental partnership with the World Wildlife Federation 
(“WWF”).  In neutral tones, he discussed the “language barriers” that can arise between 
NGOs, which speak an “aspirational language,” and companies, which must speak a 
“specific language of performance.”  The barrier becomes particularly daunting, he said, 
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with respect to the definition of success or failure.  He also discussed the inherent 
difficulties in developing a relationship with an NGO that may have its own stakeholders 
all over the world:  “Who are you actually dealing with?” 
During the question period, his remarks elicited an attack from a woman in the 
audience who worked for the WWF.  She asserted that “APP kept on talking while they 
logged the rainforest,” and contrasted APP’s behavior with that of other companies with 
which WWF had engaged.  The APP man responded that “the differences between 
companies on the ground are very small,” and arise “on the basis of style of 
engagement.”  He concluded that he was “personally hurt by WWF’s failure to make 
meetings and return calls.” 
The point of these details is that they reveal an important distinction between CSR 
engagement in rhetoric and in practice.  At the Los Angeles conference, the CSR 
movement presented itself as a monolith of like-minded people who engage in a 
uniformly positive rhetoric.  When it comes time to practice the theory, however, as the 
London conference suggests, CSR practitioners are subject to the same pressures as 
business and political partners. 
 A final and striking point is that, at conferences and in interviews, we have 
observed a convergence of the speaking styles of the corporate and the nonprofit 
participants in the CSR movement.  The corporate participants are entirely comfortable 
with the rhetoric of the NGO world.  But at the same time, NGO executives are now 
routinely talking about their respective “brands.”  Indeed, in one interview, a 
representative from a well-known environmental organization dismissed a somewhat 
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rowdier competitor as “unbranded.”  NGO people also regularly discuss adapting the 
corporate concept of “accountability” to their own organizations, seeking various kinds of 
“bottom lines” to apply to their activities.  And even as they themselves function as 
stakeholders, they are beginning to acknowledge that they, too, have stakeholders who 
may have divergent views of the organization’s mission. 
The Themes of CSR Discourse 
Beyond these issues of look and feel, the content of the discourse at these and 
other conferences and in our interviews has also been revealing.  The sections that follow 
briefly introduce some of the themes that have been recurrent in our work. 
1.  CSR and Voice: Who Speaks for Whom? 
As CSR is practiced, almost everyone purports to be speaking for someone or 
something else.    Corporate employees assert the interests of their employers, which are 
indeterminate legal fictions.  Government representatives speak for constituencies that 
are usually ill-defined, and sometimes for even vaguer conceptual entities like “the 
nation.”  NGOs almost by definition speak for others’ interests: indigenous people, 
workers, “the environment.”  What are the bases for these actors’ claims to speak for 
others?  How legitimate are they?   
CSR participants are aware of this issue, at least on a superficial level. In Los 
Angeles in 2003, for example, much discussion involved the question of who counts as a 
stakeholder.  Most CSR participants immediately include employees, residents of 
communities where the company has a significant presence (or “footprint”), and the 
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governments of affected locales.  Our contacts within corporations, even in the United 
States, almost always list employees, customers, and community residents as 
stakeholders.  To this list the Los Angeles and London conference participants added, 
uniformly, “civil society,” which tends to be used synonymously with “NGOs.”   
In all of our observations and interviews, we have heard surprisingly little 
analysis of how particular NGOs become stakeholders in particular companies.  One 
obvious way is by “campaigning” against the company and then being approached to 
enter into a “partnership,” as in the Greenpeace-npower case just discussed.  Others gain 
de facto stakeholder recognition from a company after campaigning against it, though 
they are not offered formal partnerships.  We have heard of other instances in which 
companies invited NGOs into partnerships because of their visibility and apparent 
expertise on particular issues, such as rainforest protection, climate change, or labor 
rights. Neither in our observations nor our interviews (where we have posed the question 
directly), however, has anyone set out any explicit criteria for deciding who gets a seat at 
the stakeholder table.  Instead, some have acknowledged that it depends largely on an 
NGO’s ability to make noise. 
The disconnection between transnational elites and local realities has surfaced 
throughout the project.  As we write, news sources report the ramming of a Greenpeace 
ship by a Turkish fishing boat (Associated Press 2008).  During a 2004 World Bank-
sponsored online conference about CSR in small and medium-sized enterprises, a 
comment by a representative of a Nigerian NGO was both pointed and poignant: the 
“challenge of being [a] socially responsible SME is not valid when their possibilities of 
existence [are] close to zero.”    
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A related problem is the potential of the CSR movement to inhibit the growth of 
strong local institutions in places where corporations are “engaged” with NGOs.  In some 
instances, circumventing a corrupt local government is the very purpose of the corporate-
NGO partnership.  But even where the local government (particularly at the regional or 
village level) is doing its honest best, the partnership’s economic and political muscle 
may make it appear irrelevant.  When this happens, a number of our informants have 
warned, local good government advocates may simply give up.  The effects of this are 
particularly pernicious when the specific work of the partnership (in one example given, 
insuring that an influx of workers to build a plant did not disrupt local life) is done, the 
foreigners have largely withdrawn, and the locals are, once again, left to fend for 
themselves.  Far from being strengthened by the activities of the corporate-NGO 
partnership, local institutions will have atrophied, leaving the community less prepared 
than ever to deal with the challenges of globalization (compare Ferguson 2005). 
2. What Is “Stakeholder Dialog?” 
Stakeholder dialogs are structured discussions among company participants, 
advocacy groups and other members of civil society, employees, and community 
members.  The specific goals of the dialogs vary depending on the company and the 
social issues it faces.  In general, though, they have the stated objective of creating a 
forum and a format for two-way communication.  Stakeholders provide information to 
the company about their concerns while the company has a context outside advertising or 
formal public relations to express its views about contested social issues. “Engagement” 
through stakeholder dialog is treated as a great good throughout the CSR movement.  
NGOs and socially responsible investors demand it, and, at least in Europe and the U.K., 
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governments encourage it, and may even delegate their regulatory roles to such dialogs. 
Among CSR enthusiasts, dialog with non-shareholders is seen as the process through 
which the concerns of the powerless are heard.   
But even as dialog gives stakeholders a voice in corporate deliberations, it offers 
companies a way to control the way in which that voice is exercised.  This point initially 
occurred to us during the British American Tobacco presentation at the 2003 BSR 
conference, when one of the company’s representatives described the stakeholder dialog 
as beginning with the “mapping and classification” of stakeholders.  BAT speakers also 
talked of using consultants to select stakeholder participants by determining “who exactly 
the key players are”; extensive preparation in order to “systematize” the dialog; achieving 
“consistency across regions” in order “to avoid sending different messages to different 
parts of the world”; and being careful to “provide stakeholders with clear parameters to 
show if the company was really doing what it had committed.”  
Equator Principles banks illustrate the same point.  The bankers, lawyers, and 
consultants we have interviewed have all emphasized that each of the original signatory 
banks had endured an out-of-control NGO campaign; the German bank West LLB, for 
example, suffered the ignominy of protesters rappelling down the side of its headquarters 
building and unfurling banners.  These same sources have all characterized the EP 
consultation and reporting process as a way to systematize and control the banks’ 
relations with NGOs and thereby minimize reputational damage.  In January 2008, for 
example, when West withdrew its financing for an Indonesian gold mining project, its 
action was reported only on obscure NGO websites (e.g., Mining and Communities 
2008).   
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On the one hand, these approaches are perfectly rational, if not inevitable steps in 
organizing a potentially chaotic conversation with a host of self-proclaimed stakeholders.  
But on the other, to organize is to discipline, to control, and to limit.  Becoming engaged 
with a powerful institution comes at a cost (Foucault 1977:222). In the case of the state, 
to be recognized by it often means to acquiesce in its methods of classification and rules 
of engagement, to give up a part of one’s autonomy (compare Merry’s (1990) “paradox 
of legal entitlement”).  The same principles may apply to the multinational corporation, a 
creature of the state that mimics it in many important respects (Scott 1998; Ferguson 
2005).  From this perspective, what a company like BAT characterizes as the value-
neutral “facilitation” of stakeholder dialog can be seen as an exercise in control—control 
over who participates, how things get said, and, consequently if indirectly, what gets said.   
3.  How Serious Are the Participating Corporations? 
Our interviews of corporate CSR specialists and their consultants are providing a 
window on the day-to-day world of CSR in practice.  As might be expected, what we 
have heard is calmer, more reflective, and sometimes more cynical than what is said in 
the revival-like atmosphere of a large gathering.  Nonetheless, the content is consistent.  
People think that CSR is here to stay and is effecting a meaningful change in corporate 
behavior.  Both corporate CSR specialists and outside consultants believe that the 
executives they work for take it seriously.  It is widely believed that if a company adopts 
appropriate processes for talking with stakeholders and reporting its performance then 
salutary outcomes will ensue. 
 20
Interestingly, the jury of CSR insiders is still out on the economic benefits to be 
derived from good corporate citizenship.  With the exception of those in the socially 
responsible investment business, we have not heard anyone make a robust claim that CSR 
can be shown to boost the traditional bottom line.  People within companies have 
discussed positive effects on employee recruitment and retention as well as customer 
loyalty, but, surprisingly to us, most have made no serious efforts to quantify these 
perceived benefits.  Nonetheless, everyone with whom we have spoken believes that CSR 
will prove itself to be economically efficient, at least in the negative sense of heading off 
such things as labor unrest, customer defections, costly environmental problems, and, 
importantly, government interventions.  As far as consumers are concerned, however, 
every person we have heard or interviewed has agreed with the proposition that they 
(except for an affluent niche) will not pay more for responsibly-produced products. 
Against this background of general corporate optimism, our work has also 
revealed widespread skepticism.  In this view, CSR participation is little more than a 
show of voluntary reform intended to head off government mandates, preempt NGO 
attacks, and succor favor with the minority of CSR-conscious consumers.  One proponent 
of this view has described corporate participants in CSR as “struggling to structure it 
around voluntary self-regulation and to position themselves as authoritative players 
within it” (Shamir 2004a:655). 
The skeptical view was vividly represented in a 2004 report by Christian Aid, a 
respected British relief agency, entitled Behind the Mask: The Real Face of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. The report defines CSR as nothing more than “a catch-all term 
increasingly used by business, which encompasses the voluntary codes, principles and 
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initiatives companies adopt in their general desire to confine corporate responsibility to 
self-regulation.”  It characterizes the whole movement as a disingenuous public relations 
exercise: “corporate enthusiasm for CSR is not driven primarily by a desire to improve 
the lot of the communities in which companies work. . . Rather, companies are concerned 
with their own reputations, with the potential damage of public campaigns directed 
against them, and overwhelmingly, with the desire–and the imperative-to secure ever–
greater profits.” And turning to what we have termed the “CSR community,” the report 
observes that London “is now awash with PR consultants, social auditors, firms providing 
verification or ‘assurance’ for companies’ social and environmental reports, and bespoke 
investment analysts all vying for business.” 
4. What is the Role of the NGOs? 
There is evidence from our observations and interviews that even as NGOs 
develop a more corporate style, their substantive outlook and behavior grow more 
corporate as well.  At the 2005 London conference, the research and advocacy director 
for SustainAbility, a British consultancy that is one of the most prominent and players in 
the CSR movement, observed that the nature of NGOs’ power is changing.  Traditionally, 
he said, NGOs sought and exercised power “through confrontation”; now, however, they 
are “controlling the agenda and defining the choices that are available” to companies 
facing CSR pressure.  NGOs are “no longer just gadflies,” he continued, but are “part of 
the system now.”  NGO officials acknowledge this, but at the same time worry about the 
effect on their “brands.”  Representatives of Greenpeace and other environmental 
organizations have repeatedly stressed to us the need to avoid complicity in the 
“greenwashing” of corporate environmental malfeasance. 
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Another piece of evidence is NGOs’ growing concern with accountability.  For 
example, a plenary panel at the 2005 London conference was devoted to “NGO 
accountability…what’s being done to create greater transparency?”  Transparency is not 
just a business buzzword, of course, but has long been the pivotal concept in financial 
reporting.  One speaker, from the educational NGO One World Trust, declared that 
accountability must be “embedded in the NGO, from the top down”—a statement we 
have heard from and about dozens of corporations.  A panelist from Christian Aid 
acknowledged that “NGOs like Christian Aid are not as accountable as they should be,” 
decrying NGOs that engage in “horrible company-style CSR presentations.” There was 
also general agreement that, as NGOs demand that corporations account to their broad 
stakeholder base, the NGOs must do the same. 
But the same discussion also illuminated a number of significant differences 
between NGO and corporate accountability.  An anonymous questioner from the floor 
argued that NGOs must be wary of demands for accountability, since they are sometimes 
a pretext for efforts to defang aggressive NGOs and limit their ability to act.  The 
representative of One World Trust made the point that, whereas NGOs are spread out 
across cultures, accountability is an Anglo-Saxon word and concept:  “Accountability 
doesn’t translate into almost any other language.”  He asked what “accountability” could 
mean in the case of NGOs, arguing that “it’s not legitimacy, not democracy, nor 
transparency.”   
Some theorists have analyzed the discourse of social movements in terms of 
“frames,” or “ways of packaging and presenting ideas that generate shared beliefs, 
motivate collective action, and define appropriate strategies of action” (Merry 2006b:41).  
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NGOs that participate in CSR activities confront a dilemma that is endemic to social 
movements: framing their ideas in ways that simultaneously appeal to their members’ 
traditions and promote change—frames, in other words, that allow for both legitimacy 
and efficacy.  To take the example of Greenpeace, its leadership emphasizes its tradition 
as a “campaigning NGO” with “fairly radical policy positions.” But that same leadership 
now believes it necessary to enter into corporate partnerships in order to effect change.  
Can Greenpeace and other NGOs have it both ways?  
Analyzing the Discourse of CSR Reporting 
Similar themes can be seen in the written CSR reports that increasing numbers of 
global companies now publish.  These reports are typically glossy, elaborate documents 
that resemble annual reports to shareholders in their professional production values.  
Various sorts of specialists are involved in their preparation and “verification.”  However, 
they are entirely voluntary, neither their existence nor their format being dictated by 
governments.  Thus, they reflect the considered choices that companies make about how 
to discuss corporate social responsibility, and their style and content are especially 
revealing for this reason. 
Sharon Livesey (2002a, 2002b), a lawyer and business communication scholar, 
has recently initiated the critical linguistic analysis of corporate CSR reports.  We have 
also begun work of our own in this area, and describe some of our results below.  
Livesey’s method involves the identification and categorization of “salient themes, 
metaphors, modes of expression, and argument structures” (Livesey 2002a:321)  She 
draws on Foucault’s perspective, emphasizing his belief that “meaning is not fixed; 
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rather, it must be constantly reproduced and reconstituted” (ibid.:319).  CSR discourse 
represents such a reconstitution, “the emergence of a new, unstable discursive order, 
which joins the heterogeneous elements of the distinct domains of economics, 
environmentalism, and social justice” (ibid.).  From the Foucaldian perspective, power 
can be both a cause and an effect of controlling this emergent discourse.  More 
specifically, as Shamir (2004a:680) has put it, “[t]he bureaucratization and 
standardization of social responsibility transforms the heretofore politically loaded and 
morally debated notions of corporate responsibility into a measurable set of indicators 
that can be exchanged and traded.” 
Our first subjects have been the 2003 and 2006 (the most recent available) reports 
issued by ExxonMobil and British American Tobacco p.l.c.  We chose ExxonMobil  
because it entered the CSR era as perhaps the world’s greatest environmental villain 
following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989.  We selected BAT to complement our 
previous analysis of the public discourse strategies employed by its CSR team, and 
because of the particular difficulties faced by a tobacco company holding itself out as 
socially responsible.  In very different ways, the two companies’ reports are the 
embodiment of Shamir’s (2004a:680) “bureaucratization and standardization of social 
responsibility.” 
From the very beginning, the short, succinct, and glossy ExxonMobil 2003 report 
blends the social and the economic, the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’, the rhetoric of care and the 
rhetoric of analysis.  The single-page introductory letter from Chairman and CEO Lee R. 
Raymond states as the company’s the goal the creation of “sustainable shareholder value” 
(ExxonMobil 2003:1).  This simple yet powerful phrasing merges the traditional, 
 25
narrowly economic vision of corporate fiduciary responsibility with the loosely-defined 
notion of sustainability, with all of its connotations of broader social and environmental 
responsibility. But the next two paragraphs redefine social responsibility in primarily 
economic terms, and disclaim the company’s ability to exert substantial influence in the 
non-economic sphere (ibid.): 
However, we cannot be all things to all people . . . our primary 
responsibility to society is to do our job well–providing the world with 
abundant, affordable energy in a safe, reliable and environmentally 
responsible manner. 
Many other forces–cultural, political and environmental–have an impact on 
society that is greater than ours. 
Finally, the chairman states that even ExxonMobil’s “wider involvement in society” will 
be governed by ‘hard’ analysis, the “rigorously applied management systems” that mark 
its core endeavors:  “Our approach to corporate citizenship reflects our scale and the 
disciplined approach we take to all aspects of our business” (ibid.) 
The remainder of the 41-report is a detailed playing-out of these themes.  The 
illustrations (which are found on every page) are a striking combination of colorful 
graphs and charts and photographs of children, tigers, and ExxonMobil employees of 
every race and many nationalities.  In the text, disciplined management and analysis are 
repeatedly described as the keys to ExxonMobil’s social accountability.  The “Operations 
Management Integrity System” is the critical “framework for meeting [ExxonMobil’s] 
commitments to the highest operational standards of safety, health and environmental 
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protection”; under this system, “[a] broad range of factors is analyzed, including 
economic, environmental and social” (ibid.:3) In the environmental sphere, OIMS is 
augmented by “Environmental Business Planning” (ibid.:12), which helps the company 
“to prevent incidents” (ibid.:13).  Quantitative “performance indicators” are used to track 
environmental progress (ibid.).  ExxonMobil brings a new and literal salience to the 
notion of micro-management, employing “’molecule management’ to yield high-value 
products while improving energy efficiency and lowering emissions” (ibid.:14).  Even the 
air is systematized, with emissions being “most effectively managed at the point of 
discharge” (ibid.). 
Greenhouse gases and climate change are the subject of a more complex and 
ambiguous rhetoric.  The discussion begins with a qualified acknowledgment of the 
problem:  “We recognize that the risk of climate change and its potential impacts on 
society and ecosystems may prove to be significant” (ibid.:9).  The essence of the 
response is consistent with the rest of the report:  “to take sensible, economic actions now 
to improve efficiency and reduce future global emissions” (ibid.).  But the application of 
the management-based logic seen elsewhere is complicated by the absence of appropriate 
discourse structures, there being “currently no commonly accepted methodology for 
accounting for greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.:15).  One of the few appeals to hard fact 
in this section of the report is the statement that it is really someone else’s problem: 
“developing countries represent only 25 percent of the global economy and yet produce 
almost 50 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide (or carbon) emissions,” and are likely to 
account for 80 percent of the carbon increase in the next 20 years (ibid.). 
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ExxonMobil’s 2006 report carries the quantitative discourse of science even 
further.  Consistent with the chairman’s initial statement of the company’s “rigorous 
approach to corporate citizenship” ( ExxonMobil 2006:3), numbers are everywhere:  a 
dense page of “citizenship performance data” (ibid.:5); another with nine different 
measures of “engagement activities by group” (ibid.:5); and constant quantification of 
money spent and spills and injuries reduced.  Even the preservation of a twenty-acre 
wetland gets mentioned (ibid.:23).  One wonders if the numbers bring helpful precision to 
readers, or if the overall effect is numbing.   
As in 2003, the qualitative aspects of the 2006 report present a sometimes jarring 
rhetorical juxtaposition of control and powerlessness.  In its approach to CSR, for 
example, the company claims near-omniscience:  “Our efforts are guided by in-depth 
scientific understanding of the environmental impact of our operations, as well as by the 
social and environmental needs of the communities in which we operate” (ibid.:14).    
Even the complexities of human rights yield to analytical rigor, as the report also 
provides “an example of how we manage and respond to potential human rights issues” 
(ibid.:41)(emphasis added).   
But there are also assertions of helplessness.  Here again, climate change “remains 
an extraordinarily complex area of scientific study,” raising a risk that “could prove to be 
significant” (ibid.:3).   On the social front, on the question of domestic partner benefits, 
the company defers to country-by-country legal definitions and “provides coverage to 
spouses—whether heterosexual or homosexual—where a legally recognized spousal 
relationship exists. . . In the United States, we have adopted the definition of spouse used 
in federal legislation, which has the effect of limiting coverage to heterosexual couples” 
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(ibid.:29)(emphasis added).  The result of this passive approach, of course, is that the 
company is unlikely to have to provide same-sex partner benefits in the U.S. at any time 
in the foreseeable future, since any definitional changes will almost certainly be made at 
the state level. 
The 2003 BAT document is very different in appearance.  It is a dense, sprawling 
report, with 158 pages of compact text and few illustrations.  Its content exhibits both 
similarities to and differences from the approach taken by Exxon Mobil.  In his single-
page introduction, BAT chairman Martin Broughton stresses, as ExxonMobil does, the 
primacy of economics as a motivation for CSR:  “Corporate social responsibility is 
integral to our approach to the management of our business globally and to building long 
term shareholder value” (ibid.:3). 
Elsewhere on the same page, however, the discourse of traditional financial 
management yields to the alternative ‘soft’ discourses of communication and feelings.  
For example, whereas the sentence just quoted is the only reference to shareholders in the 
chairman’s letter, there are eight mentions of the open-ended, contested category of 
“stakeholders.”  There is repeated emphasis on the goal of “dialogue” with these 
undefined stakeholders—“stimulating discussions, as stakeholders share their views, 
concerns, criticisms and indeed some praise.”  This communicative process can evoke 
emotional responses, as when the chairman acknowledges that “[i]t is disappointing that 
we still encounter reluctance amongst the tobacco control and public health communities 
to engage in dialogue.”  Nonetheless, BAT’s “doors remain open” to “stakeholders in 
these groups” as BAT strives to show by action “that we mean it.”  Presumably, any 
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representative of these interests who chooses to join the dialog thereby becomes a 
stakeholder, which further highlights the indeterminacy of that category. 
Apparently something has changed.  In 2006, BAT adopted the strategy of 
“reporting more briefly this year than previously . . . taking a little time out to review our 
reporting, with the aim of moving to a Sustainability Report next year” (British American 
Tobacco 2006:1; the Sustainability Report is not available as of June 1, 2008).  In a move 
toward the rhetoric of accounting, the chief executive states that while “completeness and 
responsiveness are as important as ever, we recognise that these should not mean 
reporting each year on all issues that could be relevant to stakeholders, but that the 
principle of materiality should be considered more fully” (ibid.).   
Despite its much-abbreviated (32 generously-spaced pages) format, the 2006 
report also goes back and forth between hard and soft discourses.  Under the heading of 
“our performance,” it provides concise, bullet-point-laden statements of “action” and 
“response” in such categories as “Youth smoking prevention,” “Harm reduction,” and 
“Secondary supply chain.”  Harm reduction is especially interesting, as the company 
promises continuing efforts to “bring to market a new generation of tobacco products 
[primarily “Swedish snus,” a kind of dipping tobacco] that meet consumer appeal and 
will, over time, be recognized by scientific and regulatory authorities as posing 
substantially reduced risks to health” (ibid.:6).  But, just as in 2003, BAT employs a 
rhetoric of surprise and hurt at the failure of health authorities to meet it halfway:  “we 
are working to improve our engagement with external scientists”; “We believe there is no 
rational justification for continuing to bar smokers from choosing a less hazardous 
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alternative to cigarettes”; “Regrettably, the Chief Executive [of Cancer Research UK] 
declined to meet us”(ibid.). 
The major change from 2003 is the apparent fall from primacy of stakeholder 
dialog:  “In our previous Reports, we have focused on what our stakeholders expect from 
us.  For this summary Report, we have taken a different approach.” In 2006, the emphasis 
is on “the thoughts and opinions gathered in the dialogue,” not “reporting against each 
individual session.”  The voice of stakeholders, in other words, has become even further 
attenuated.  Now BAT not only selects the stakeholders and systematizes the discourse, 
but distills its contents. 
It is difficult to predict what, if any, practical changes this shift in listening and 
reporting practices portends.  Will BAT will pay greater attention to its social and 
environmental performance?  Will the downgrading of stakeholder dialog cost the 
company its status as a perceived (if improbable) CSR leader?  Or will the new reporting 
strategy, if and when it emerges, set a new standard for reputation management?  
A final point about reporting is the role of external “assurance,” the CSR version 
of financial auditing by certified public accountants.  Most CSR reports by major 
corporations end with an opinion letter from an organization such as Bureau Veritas 
(BAT 2006) or Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance (ExxonMobil 2006).  In general 
appearance and form, they are strongly evocative of financial auditors’ opinion letters, 
and thus send a message about standards and rigor.  But their content is stunningly vague.  
In the case of ExxonMobil, Lloyd’s concludes, for example, that the company “has 
processes in place that ensure sites that contribute to safety, health, and environmental 
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metrics understand corporate reporting obligations”; and that the company’s system “is 
effective in delivering safety, health, and environmental indicators that are useful for 
assessing corporate performance.”  Similarly, Bureau Veritas finds that “the information 
presented in [BAT’s] Summary Report is reliable and objective, and presented in a clear 
and understandable manner”; and that the report “addresses material issues identified 
through stakeholder dialogues in previous cycles.” 
On reflection, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise.  It would be difficult for 
an “auditor” to be especially substantive when the bulk of what is reported is process.  
Despite a great deal of talk about emerging CSR “metrics,” the things that command 
attention among those we have observed and interviewed are, as we have noted above, 
such intangibles as dialog, the embedding of CSR “in the corporate DNA,” and 
embarking on journeys.  While the assurance companies play an important role in 
legitimizing the self-regulation that is CSR, they appear to provide little that would be of 
value to a skeptical outsider, whether a “campaigning NGO” or a hard-headed investor. 
Conclusions 
 At this point in the project, three major theoretical themes have emerged.  All 
three are prominent in the anthropological literature about global movements and 
multinational corporations. 
 The first involves the related—indeed inseparable—issues of voice and 
transnational elites.  At almost every turn in CSR practice, someone else speaks for the 
local communities that are its presumed beneficiaries.  These communities are 
extraordinarily diverse.  They include resource sites in the developing world, emerging-
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economy locales to which manufacturing is outsourced, and places in the developed 
world that used to host the outsourced facilities. Most often, such communities are 
spoken for by NGOs.  These NGOs may have local connections, but in most cases it is 
only the well-known transnational brands that can get the attention of multinational 
corporations. 
 The issue of voice is becoming especially salient in our early work on the Equator 
Principles.  EP banks require companies seeking loans for major projects to commission 
environmental and social impact assessments.  These are typically contracted out to 
consulting firms that employ a range of experts from engineering to anthropology.  It is 
also common for major NGOs to be invited in as watchdogs.  The voices of affected 
individuals, even if they are heard in the first instance, must survive several layers of 
interpretation and reporting by these representatives of transnational financial and 
knowledge elites. 
 As new governance critics point out, and as NGO representatives readily 
acknowledge, this reality raises profound questions of legitimacy and accountability.  Do 
particular NGOs get selected to “engage” with corporations because of their ability to 
give legitimate voice to otherwise powerless interests?  Or is it because the corporations 
value their recognizable brands and trust them not to behave too badly?  And if NGOs do 
become complicit in greenwashing, who will know?  Who is watching the watchdogs?  It 
may be that “authentic” mid-level institutions will emerge, local enough to “speak for 
culture” yet with enough transnational clout to be accepted by companies as engagement 
partners.  But at this stage in the history of CSR, the practical answer may be that there 
are no obvious alternatives to the current state of affairs. 
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 The second major theme is the time and energy that corporations devote to the 
management of CSR discourse.    Their efforts include the “mapping” of stakeholders, the 
administration of stakeholder dialogs and NGO engagements, the preparation of CSR 
reports, and the public discussion of it all.  Regardless of what they may or may not be 
doing on the ground, corporations are wholly committed to the process of CSR talk, and 
to talking about that talk. Corporate decision-makers clearly realize that imparting order 
to a potentially chaotic discourse is a tangible source of power as they seek to mange 
their companies’ reputations and preempt “hard” action by governments. 
 This leads to the final theme: the impact of the CSR movement on the nation-
state.  Even rich, stable, and powerful Western states seem to have limited ability to 
control the behavior of multinational corporations and, more generally, global capital.    
Nation-by-nation jurisdiction over corporations is diminished as tangible assets are sent 
“offshore” and wealth derives increasingly from evanescent intellectual property.   At the 
same time, treaties and “international law” not backed by the threat of force are no more 
effective than they have ever been.   
 The CSR movement may be a perfect fit for this hard law vacuum.  To the extent 
that it is perceived to be a meaningful response to social and environmental problems, it 
dissuades governments from even the effort at regulation.  As a devolution of regulatory 
power to the formerly-regulated, it accords well with the currently ascendant theory of 
new governance.  And to the extent that CSR is persuasive to consumers, it also serves to 
head off market discipline of irresponsible companies, however unlikely that may be. 
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 This skepticism is not to condemn CSR out of hand, though.  The movement 
remains a work in progress.  At its best, it promises a corporate decision making process 
in which managers think and talk openly about social and environmental issues and then 
tell the world what they did and why.  At its worst, it is nothing more than an elaborate 
public relations charade in which companies perform certain prescribed rituals but 
continue to do business as usual.  But it may be even worse than business as usual, as the 
effect of the rituals may be to co-opt critics, preempt regulation, and mislead consumers. 
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